Odd Lots · Nov 12, 2026 · 54 min

Megaspeed, Nvidia chip diversion and the murky rules on remote access

Episode: What Nvidia's Megaspeed Scandal Is Really All About · With Mackenzie Hawkins

TL;DR

Bloomberg reporter Mackenzie Hawkins explains the Megaspeed investigation, how chips may be diverted through Southeast Asia, and why remote access to Nvidia compute is generally legal.

Key takeaways

  1. Megaspeed was described as the largest Southeast Asian buyer of Nvidia chips and a major compute supplier to Alibaba.4:51
  2. The US probe examined whether Megaspeed diverted chips into mainland China, which the company has denied.6:32
  3. Chip orders must name a delivery destination, and prosecutions allege those stated destinations were false.11:05
  4. Nvidia's tally left about 50,000 chips unaccounted for against Malaysian and Indonesian trade records, mostly Blackwell chips.16:31
  5. Selling chips into Southeast Asia for remote access by Chinese firms is generally legal, with only narrow exceptions.28:32
  6. Huawei executives reportedly expect it will take until 2030 to meet domestic demand for its AI chips.37:47
  7. An investor deck used a Shanghai rendering for a data center, while the company described another facility in an unnamed country.19:40
  8. On paper Megaspeed is owned by a Singapore shell whose owner is a Singapore-national CEO, who could not be reached.36:27

Summary

The hosts, Joe Weisenthal and Tracy Alloway, call the reported Nvidia affair story enormous and stress that Nvidia sits at the center of the AI trade through both its chips and its financing of partners. Guest Mackenzie Hawkins, a Bloomberg tech reporter based in Hong Kong, says the Megaspeed story has been developing for more than a year. She describes Megaspeed as the largest Southeast Asian buyer of Nvidia chips and a major compute supplier to Alibaba, and says it bought about $4.6 billion of Nvidia hardware while under US and Singapore investigation.

Hawkins says renting remote compute is common across Southeast Asian data centers and is generally legal, so the core suspicion is that chips were physically diverted into mainland China, which Megaspeed denies. Her team began looking at the company while reporting on Chinese data center operators that had sought 115,000 restricted chips, because Southeast Asian supply sources kept naming Megaspeed. They found no concrete proof of smuggling but many inconsistencies in its data center footprint that neither Megaspeed nor Nvidia has explained. On paper the company is wholly owned by a Singapore shell controlled by a Singapore-national CEO, who could not be reached.

Hawkins describes how diversion works in prosecutions. Nvidia mainly sells to server makers, which pass hardware through distributors, and orders must name a destination to win approval. Cases allege that stated destinations were false from the start, that some data centers never existed, and that customs forms described restricted hardware in vague terms. The central question, she says, is whose job it is to know. In one Supermicro-linked case, an audit allegedly did not stop repeated shipments. Nvidia has removed companies from an internal whitelist after an indictment, which raises questions about why they were approved originally. Hawkins argues the company has lost credibility on the issue, leaving it in a catch-22.

The inconsistencies center on Nvidia’s own tally. After US government requests, Nvidia counted chips across more than 12 data centers owned by eight companies in three countries. Comparing that with trade records, Hawkins’ team found about 50,000 chips unaccounted for, mostly Blackwell chips. Nvidia later pointed to warehouses and said it had identified nearly all the chips Megaspeed bought through its partners. Hawkins says she has asked about further checks ten to twelve times without answers. Megaspeed’s largest data center reportedly dropped it as a tenant, and an investor deck included a Shanghai rendering for a project in a country the company did not name.

On policy, Hawkins says remote access to Nvidia chips in Southeast Asia is legal in most cases, and the Trump administration is not enforcing the Biden-era AI diffusion rule that would have restricted it. After a White House adviser publicly said Moonshot had obtained Blackwell chips and accessed them in Thailand, the Commerce Department’s enforcement unit began mapping where remote access happens, and senior officials debated restrictions. On Huawei, executives expect it will take until 2030 to meet domestic demand, though DeepSeek reportedly ordered 160,000 of its chips. Hawkins expects more congressional scrutiny through an annual defense bill and under a Democratic Congress next year. The hosts close by noting the apparent paradox that a company with strong demand could be far more selective with its customers.

Quotes

“Megaspeed is the single largest Southeast Asian buyer of NVIDIA chips.”
Odd Lots · 4:51
“It's the suspicion that the company has not just rented compute to Chinese offtakers, but actually diverted those, like the physical hardware into mainland China.”
Odd Lots · 6:20
“We found an extraordinary number of inconsistencies in their data center footprint that neither the company nor NVIDIA have been able to explain.”
Odd Lots · 10:03
“I mean, it's the internet. I don't even know what borders mean.”
Odd Lots · 29:53

Who should listen

Listeners following chip export controls, US China tech policy or AI infrastructure who want a reporter's detailed account of how Nvidia chips move through the supply chain.

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This summary was written with AI from the episode transcript and reviewed before publishing. Quotes are checked word for word against the transcript, and timestamps are approximate. Quotes without a named speaker are attributed to the show.